This is an essay I wrote in late 2016 on Rother and Peterson.
I want to tell you about Mike Rother’s book Toyota Kata, but we are going to have to take some turns to get there. You know how sometimes if you talk with someone who has been practicing a discipline or craft for a long time—and it almost doesn’t matter which one—they’ll tell you how, over time, it has shaped their life? It isn’t everyone that says this, which is maybe more interesting than that anyone says it, but some people will tell you (and maybe you’re one of those people) that their vocation, or their primary hobby, teaches them how to live. Rother’s book taught me that this also applies to industrial engineering and management practices.
I already had a hunch. It’s hard to explain why without getting into a long digression about manufacturing and the automobile industry in the US and Japan, but I will try to make it a short digression. Some really smart researchers have in effect devoted their professional lives to trying to answer questions something like: ‘why are Toyota manufacturing plants more productive and efficient than US plants?’ and ‘why can’t US companies seem to duplicate this success—even the ones who are specifically trying to employ the same manufacturing methods, and even though Toyota is very open in discussing, even publishing, these methods?’ This topic has been written about so much that an episode of This American Life is devoted to it.
If you’re skeptical about the dominance of Toyota in the 20th century, consider that from 1937 to 2008, it operated at a profit, gained market share, and produced more reliable cars than American automobile manufacturers. And Rother observes that US companies have been trying, openly, for decades, to mimic the Toyota Production System and failing to do so.
What Toyota eventually started calling the Toyota Production System is more or less what the process community in the US calls lean manufacturing, from the term lean production system, coined by John Krafcik in an article published in the MIT Sloan Management Review in 1988.
The process improvement community has a lot of lean true believers. When a company I worked at announced that a group of us would be taking Lean Six Sigma training, my favorite co-worker at the time, observing the reaction this received, commented to me, ‘I wish they’d calm down. It’s not a new religion.’ I wasn’t so sure.
Given the impact Japanese automotive manufacturing has had on the US economy, it’s not surprising that writers who think they’ve answered these question get excited. I wondered if I had picked up on some of that enthusiasm. I read books by J. Edwards Deming, Jeffrey Liker, John Shook, John Krafcik, and Jim Womack. A lot of it was dry, but there were always paragraphs that made my spine tingle in a way that would have made more sense if I were reading a book on another topic—a book by Pëma Chödrön on meditation, or even David Allen on time management, books whose authors purported to be telling you something that should have have a big impact on your life. But I wasn’t just picking up something in their tone. At times, reading Rother, I felt a strange disorientation, as if, lost in thought, I had wandered into another room and was now holding the wrong book.
And it wasn’t that these books were giving me insight into how to improve my career. I had by this time left the manufacturing industry. I was still doing technical writing and process improvement, but for office processes. I felt that these books were telling me how to live. This thought was a second layer of disorientation. Even after reflecting, and after going back and rereading a jarring paragraph, I found that I wasn’t mistaken. The text felt big. It felt bigger than my books on buddhism, on spirituality, on meditation. It felt fundamental, transcendent. It wasn’t until I read Jordan Peterson’s book Maps of Meaning that I started to see why.
It seems impossible it extricate or summarize the web of concepts of MoM. It is a huge book, and dense, and it doesn’t even cover that much ground. It circles and circles Jungian concepts and mythological examples, and it bores into them with explanations from modern psychology. It is utterly convincing. But if I were to pick one quote to summarize MoM, it would be from Jung.
“Until you make the unconscious conscious, it will direct your life and you will call it fate.”
Consider this quote in the context that all of your perceptions are perceived first, and maybe only, by your unconscious mind. The feeling of being conscious of seeing something isn’t what is doing the seeing. If anything, it is the experience of several modules in our brain all firing their synapses in similar patterns, all looking at the same thing, creating this special feeling of consciousness.
The brain isn’t designed to observe objects. For millions of years, before our eyes even worked very well, we evolved to perceive threats and potential (typically reproductive or caloric) rewards. Our brain has grown a lot of sophisticated modules over the past few million years, but it hasn’t gotten rid of its underlying structures. The brain, at its base, still sees threats and potential rewards. And by sees, I mean sees. It sees them before, and with greater cognitive resonance than, our visual cortex. In the same way that you will pull your hand away from a hot object without a conscious thought, because the reaction is coming from your spinal column, not your brain, so your brain processes the contextual relevance of an object to your interests before you process it as an object with color and shape and so on. And mythology works at this level, the Unconscious level. So do rituals.
Myth is not primitive proto-science. It is a qualitatively different phenomenon. Science might be considered “description of the world with regards to those aspects that are consensually apprehensible” or “specification of the most effective mode of reaching an end (given a defined end).” Myth can be more accurately regarded as “description of the world as it signifies (for action).” The mythic universe is a place to act, not a place to perceive. Myth describes things in terms of their unique or shared affective valence, their value, their motivational significance. The Sky (An) and the Earth (Ki) of the Sumerians are not the sky and earth of modern man, therefore; they are the Great Father and Mother of all things (including the thing—En-lil, who is actually a process—that in some sense gave rise to them).
MoM, page 9.
The reason myth acts in this way is because this is the way in which our brains most naturally act. We have evolved some cultural habits of observing objects as objects. But it’s a learned skill. Science, as the Pragmatists figured out, helps us understand the world the way works precisely because of these features of psychology. The scientific method is to make a prediction (to try to achieve an aim, even if, with our sophistication, we know we’re actually trying to disprove a hypothesis) and learn from the difference of what we expected and what resulted.
Science allows us to see because it puts reality in our way, makes it an obstacle, alters its significance by altering its context.
The reason the text of Rother’s book felt bigger was because my unconscious mind perceived its importance, before my conscious mind could.
The unconscious mind is always perceiving the world through its own language, and this affects the way we behave. And the less aware of this we are, the more we are subject to it.
The reason that US corporations failed for so long at duplicating the success of Toyota, even as they were trying to duplicate their manufacturing techniques, is that these techniques are operating on at least three levels at once:
- They are natural and obvious patterns that emulate perfect flow. Whereas in buffered production systems, there are excesses of inputs and outputs upstream and downstream of each work station, so that if any work station runs into problems, the station after it has enough inputs to keep running for awhile, and the station before it has enough space to stack up outputs for awhile, lean production systems are modified to disallow this, so that if one work station encounters problems, those before it and after it have to stop, also. This weakness also has the advantage of being closer to the ideal of perfect flow than its buffered alternative. Imagine if work stations had no downtime, if there were no mechanical problems. Then you wouldn’t want buffer. You’d want each work station to deliver its output to the station downstream of it, which would make its improvements to the part, and hand it off, and so on. The the nirvana of industry. The TPS emulates that, moving always towards it.
- Because a lean production system is also fragile (meaning it has to stop for problems), if it is viewed correctly, it brings focus onto the problems of any production system. It alters the contextual significance of the problems in a facility, because those problems are stopping the line. They stop the line because management set up the production system so they would stop the line. This is is why many US companies gave up on a lean production system eventually. Without the perspective of seeing the system at its multiple levels of utility, the most obvious solution to a line stopping repeatedly is to add the buffer back, which is what happened, either all at once, in a throwing up of hands, or over time, as workers dealt with problems in the way most obvious to them. Without understanding that the point of a lean production system is to both show you your problems and force you to deal with them, if instead you are under the misperception that you should be able to set up your production system like Toyota’s and it will run smoothly, it’s hard come to any other conclusion than that lean just doesn’t work for your plant.
- Which brings us to the third layer: if you use your manufacturing facility like a laboratory, in which experiments in lean techniques result in clear reactions (lines stopping, failure to make daily production rates, and so on), and management is diligent and steadfast in its priorities, then there is plenty of incentive to be innovative in finding ways to solve the problems that are keeping you from your objectives, especially if the team works together to identify a Next Target Condition that, while challenging, is attainable. You don’t try to go from GM in the 1970’s to Toyota in the 1990’s in a single improvement. You set a series of what Rother calls “Next Target Conditions,” moving your process, inch by inch, closer to an ideal of one-piece-flow, in which waste and buffer are removed, and the process imperfections that keep you from achieving the Next Target Condition are diligently and scientifically dealt with, through a series of hypotheses and experiments, until eventually a breakthrough comes, and the Next Target Condition becomes the Current Condition, at which time the process starts over.
Seen this way, Toyota’s method was not, as US companies misunderstood for so long, precisely an engineering one. It was a ritualistic one. It operated at the psychological level, by 1. moving them towards an ideal, 2. showing them, among all the noise, what was their next obstacle to overcome, and 3. giving them the motivation to overcome it.
In his book Maps of Meaning, Peterson describes these same concepts, but in different contexts. He explains how specific myths (from the Enûma Eliš to the Passion to the myth of St. George slaying the dragon) symbolically represent a hero voluntarily facing the threatening unknown, despite their fear, learning the nature of it, and overcoming it.
The alternative to voluntarily facing frightening and unknown threats is to avoid them. You might cultivate order and certainty in your established domain (your country, or city, or apartment, or brain) and try to ignore that changing reality around you. The problem with this technique is it is doomed 100% if the time if it runs long enough. Maybe some people can get through a lifetime living this way, but only because they are supported by society around them.
But do societies that are expansionist, that do not wall themselves in, that do not avoid threats, get to exist forever? I don’t know much history, but if I look at the US, it seems clear to me that, while we have a military and cultural presence throughout the world, we have a real education problem, which means a problem thinking. Too many of us are terrible at analysis and comprehension. And of course the symbolism of the myths applies to life in general, so a dragon can exist across the Atlantic, or it can exist in your medicine cabinet.
The US is super young by historical standards, and yet during our ascendant century, we have seen the beginning of mass extinction and the climatic prelude to much more mass extinction. Talk about a dragon. And what percentage of the population even think climate change poses a serious threat? According to a recent poll, 42%.
And a point that Rother and Peterson make is that development (improvement, growth, learning) doesn’t happen without struggle. Discomfort is a necessary part of change, and when the change is voluntary, this means the discomfort is partly from the willpower you are having to exert to make the change. The benefit is you can make the change before it is forced on you. Taiichi Ohno, in his book Toyota Production System: Beyond Large Scale Production (which I just finished reading this morning), also observes this. Ohno is the father of the Toyota Production System (though the Toyodas, Sakichi and Kiichiro, developed the Just-In-Time and self-stopping automation concepts) and, as he describes in his book, a tremendous amount of turmoil was involved in changing Toyota from a company that was trying to imitate Ford’s mass production, low-diversivity-product-blend system to what would become, first Toyota’s, and then Japan’s, iconic system of lower production, highly diverse product blend. This turmoil from Toyota staff came at a time when the head of the company was saying, we have to catch up with Ford in three years, or we’re done for. So it wasn’t that Ohno’s coworkers didn’t want change. The problem was they didn’t see his vision.
Which seems to be the situation the US is in today. It’s hard to find someone who doesn’t think we need to change what we’re doing. Disagreement seems to be around what’s wrong and what should we do differently.
So, I’ve posted three blogs now on this topic, and none of them are particularly good. Each of them comes close to getting at what I am trying to say, but none of them do it felicitously or all in the same essay.
The Triumph of Fragility is wide-ranging, and goes into details on Peterson’s book. This essay talks more about my experience. John Dewey and Mike Rother: Pragmatic Dreamers focuses more how lean production techniques force workers to change, and describes Rother’s training material a little more.
None of these is very good. There are good reasons for that. One is that I still don’t understand them very well. And one reason for that is, for the past couple of years, I have been trying to blend time management techniques with Rother’s Improvement Kata. This has had some advantages. I have been relatively productive at work. I have not, however, learned very much about Rother’s IK. In November I will take training on the IK, and in the meantime, I am using his training material on its own, without blending with my existing practices. To fail to do this is a recipe for what Rother calls a “permanent beginner,” someone who never develops mastery at something because they haven’t drilled on the fundamentals of it.
In this article, I discuss Mike Rother’s book Toyota Kata and its implications.
Mike Rother writes books about the Toyota Production System. Unlike his more notable peers, he did not attend the MIT Sloan School of Business. (John Roos was the founding director of the their International Automobile Program, for which Jim Womack was research director and John Krafcik was a researcher.) He never worked at Toyota. (Jeffrey Liker and John Shook did.) But he is a researcher at the University of Michigan College of Engineering, where Jeffrey Liker is a professor.
He doesn’t write about why the Toyota Production System (also known as a lean production system) is more efficient than other production systems, or how to introduce them at your manufacturing facility, which seems strange since he consulted for manufacturers in the US and Germany for years. He writes about how people who continuously increase the leanness of their production system transform themselves into more objective, inquisitive, and team-oriented problem-solvers, people who test their assertions instead of arguing for them, who call solutions hypotheses and their implementation experiments. Scientists, basically.
Why is writing about Toyota so popular? It’s partly because from from 1937 to 2008, it operated at a profit,1 gained market share,2 and produced more reliable cars3 than American automobile manufacturers. It may also be because, for as long as researchers have been trying to learn, teach, and sell books about how to achieve a lean production system, American companies have been failing to do so.4
And they were really motivated to succeed. In 1988, The Sloan Management Review published an article5 that illustrates though some complicated math that the leanness of a facility significantly correlates with its productivity. The article, written by Jon Krafcik titled Triumph of the Lean Production System, describes Krafcik’s research of 50 facilities in the US, Europe, and Japan. It outlines the analysis that he performed.
Krafcik looked at an array of factors: location, management policies, dollar investment in automation, age of robots, age of the plant, variety of cars produced, rework area, and others. In the article, when contrasting lean from buffered facilities, he observes that the former had extra material on hand, extra personnel to tackle unexpected problems, and extra equipment on standby. He used linear regression analysis and found that facilities with less buffer were more productive. They were also more profitable.
He also found a problem with lean operations.
It is clear, too, that lean management policies have inherent risks that must be managed with a great deal of discipline and skill. From the experience of Japanese and Western producers, it appears that this risk can be largely neutralized by developing a well-trained, flexible workforce, product designs that are easy to build with high quality, and a supportive, high-performance supplier network.
The Triumph of the Lean Production System
Lean production systems have little buffer, so they are more likely to need to stop production when there is a problem. Buffered production systems keep going.
Imagine a shop floor with five work stations. The first station is upstream of the other four. The last station is downstream of the four. The center three have both upstream and downstream stations. The upstream stations feed their outputs downstream, where they are inputs. Each station takes an input, performs a process on it, and produces an output, which goes downstream. The input of the first station is raw material, delivered from another facility. The output of the final station is a deliverable, ready to be shipped.
At a buffered facility, if workstation three is having problems and producing below-average output, the upstream and downstream workstations can keep producing because at each station there is a buffer of input and adequate space to stack output. And since none of the operators is at capacity, one can can leave their station to help address the problem without their downstream process running out of input.
Now imagine a lean facility. The operators are at capacity, and there is no buffer between stations. If station 3 falls behind, station four runs out of input, and station 2 doesn’t have space to stack output, because the shop floor was designed without it. Production stops until the problem at station 3 is resolved.
This is an illustration of a lean technique called one piece flow, or 1×1. Each work station gets an input, processes it, and places it downstream, where the next workstation is ready to process it. It is also an example of a broader concept called Just-In-Time, or JIT.
(There are many techniques. Five that get discussed a lot are one piece flow, takt time, andon, kanban, heijunka and jidoka.7 Just-In-Time or kanban is probably the most famous, though kanban is used in more than one way. It is used to refer to a visual management system using cards and columns. The way I’m using it in this essay is similar but not quite. It does involve visual management, but a particular kind, called a visual pull system.
Imagine numerous upstream workstations that produce parts for numerous downstream workstations at a facility that produces a numerous variety of products from various combinations of these parts. For complex logistical reasons, the process isn’t able to achieve one piece flow, or even for the upstream workstations to know precisely the input requirements of the downstream stations for any given day.
The way that traditional facilities managed this was for a production scheduler to guess, and turn that guess into output requirements for each upstream workstation. Those stations would produce that amount and ‘push’ them to the downstream processes, where they stacked up if they weren’t ready for them.
The kanban technique has to parts:
- Build repositories [for example, bins] with level indicators that show when inventory is low and needs replenished, and when it is high, and no more should be deposited. The upstream workstations, instead of following the guessed-at schedules, produce output when the inventory in a bin drops to a low level, and they stop when they fill it back up.
- Observe the level of the bins. When the upstream is able to consistently maintain the level, without it getting too high or too low, move the lines down. Make it harder. Move it closer to one piece flow.
For Rother’s clients (and he has had hundreds over the years), due to long lists of stubborn and often obscure obstacles in their operations, their culture, and their equipment, this was exasperatingly difficult. First management installs a bunch of unnecessary bins, when things worked just fine when they just stacked output on pallets on the shop floor, then, just when they start getting used to the new system (and maybe even start to enjoy the organization of the yellow bins) some dick from management comes out and fucks with the levels. Imagine the meetings. Imagine the union complaints. After failure and frustration, they decided the technique wasn’t for them, and they went back to their traditional methods. And this is just one example of one technique. All of the lean techniques are challenging, and, as Krafcik observed, risky. But it’s not just that, they are unnecessarily challenging. It’s as if they make it harder just to make it harder.)
So, why is the lean process more productive than the buffered? And why should American manufacturers try to implement such exasperatingly difficult techniques, when it’s not even clear that they are necessary? Krafcik’s article showed correlation but not causation, and many executives in America in the latter part of the 20th century believed that either Toyota was only doing better because of macroeconomic reasons (examples: currency exchange rates, weakness of the yen against the dollar) or because of the culture, not of Toyota, but of Japan. (Krafcik addresses this last misperception at the outset of his article, and dispelling it is a theme.) Despite these misgivings, the answer, for a few decades, that researchers and books offered went something like this: they are more productive because they are more efficient. They waste less. Wasting less makes you more productive and more profitable.
And there were good reasons to believe this. Taiichi Ohno, the architect of the what would later be called the Toyota Production System was famously obsessed with waste. Besides being brilliant, he was autocratic, and he gave marching orders: discover waste, and eliminate it. He had a list of the seven wastes (muda in Japanese). One would be forgiven for perceiving the lean techniques, developed by Ohno, the waste-hater, as methods intended solely for expunging waste.
Rother’s explanation is different. He came to it piece by piece while consulting for manufacturers in the US and Germany. Over and over, he found that when manufacturers tried to run lean processes, they failed spectacularly. Production came to a halt. People got angry, and the lesson that many organizations came to was, ‘lean is not for us.’ Who knows why it works for Toyota. Maybe they’re lying. But it doesn’t work here. After hearing this enough times, and with the help of conversations with Toyota employees, Rother began to have a revelation. What makes lean facilities more productive isn’t precisely that they operate using lean techniques; they become more productive in their struggle to do so. Failure is part of the purpose of lean techniques. Not the sole purpose. The techniques are also models of simplicity, elegance and order. (This may have been partly why it was so hard to see their hidden purpose.) But the purpose that makes them worth pursuing.
The promise that the early books seem to offer is, if you can reach or come close to this ideal state, your company will be profitable.
Rother offers a new deal: if you persistently and intelligently work together to move towards this vision by setting a series of more and more challenging target conditions, your employees will develop a level of knowledge and creative flexibility, a mastery of their environment, that they would not have otherwise.
It isn’t that implementing lean techniques makes a facility more productive. It is the changes in the characteristics of the team that does it. What Rother discovered after so many had failed in their search was that Toyota is playing internal games, for which it sets its own rules. It competes with itself. It is setting difficult, even impossible challenges, so that it can learn more about itself, discover and overcome its weaknesses, weaknesses which the games reveal. The obstacles that keep a part of the process (a set of work stations) from achieving the target condition (one piece flow, kanban, or one of the many other techniques, most of which involve some kind of metric that can always be tightened until it is unattainable ) are the obstacles that the team needs to work on next. Whenever a Toyota process actually achieves a challenge it has set, it sets the bar higher. Otherwise, the game would be over, and the learning would stop.
We should think of and use the pull system as a tool to establish target conditions in our effort to keep improving toward the ideal state condition. Each state we achieve is simply the prelude to another.
This last point was made clear by remarks from two Toyota people. The first was: “The purpose of kanban is to eliminate the kanban.” While I was still pondering that one, I heard another Toyota person say: “We don’t know how you make progress without kanban.”
Toyota Kata, page 99
The Triumph of Fragility
In Figure 5 of his article, perhaps the most important figure in the article because it shows the correlation between the leanness of a production system and its productivity, Krafcik makes an interesting choice. Instead of using the terms lean and buffered, as he had throughout the article, he uses the terms fragile and robust.
Why would a fragile system be more productive than a robust one?
If a manufacturing facility is a laboratory, then a fragile one would respond clearly to experimental changes. A robust laboratory would not. It would run just about the same unless you made significant effort to trip it up.
An organization needs to be a laboratory because people learn through experience. While the obvious reason to experiment on a system is to find ways to improve it, a more subtle benefit is there: the operator is learning about the nature of the system. She is learning, not just how to improve the system, but what the system is like. This gives her power that the operator of a robust system does not have. Maybe more importantly, in ingrains in her the habit and discipline of objective, scientific-thinking. (This is the primary premise of Toyota Kata.)
This was the insight of John Dewey and the Pragmatist philosophers: people learn when they test their understanding of the world by making a prediction, acting in some way that could falsify that prediction, and observing the results. If their prediction bears out, then maybe their understanding isn’t wrong. If it doesn’t, they know they need to revise it.
I acknowledge that another blogger has made basically the same argument.
The Triumph of Science
To see the outcome is to know in what direction the present experience is moving, provided it move normally and soundly. The far-away point, which is of no significance to us simply as far away, becomes of huge importance the moment we take it as defining a present direction of movement. Taken in this way it is no remote and distant result to be achieved, but a guiding method in dealing with the present.
John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum
The philosophy of Pragmatism is inspired by the scientific method and promotes scientific thinking, but writing this today, that might be a confusing statement. I notice a tendency among my peers to treat science as the corpus of peer-reviewed research papers. The problem with that is, even if every published research article had a sound design of experiment and was reproducible, the fact that it exists and you can read it doesn’t mean that your doing so improves your understanding of the world. Acting in the belief that this new knowledge is true, and observing the results, does.
The map is not a substitute for a personal experience. The map does not take the place of an actual journey. The logically formulated material of a science or branch of learning, of a study, is no substitute for the having of individual experiences. The mathematical formula for a falling body does not take the place of personal contact and immediate individual experience with the falling thing. But the map, a summary, an arranged and orderly view of previous experiences, serves as a guide to future experience; it gives direction; it facilitates control; it economizes effort, preventing useless wandering, and pointing out the paths which lead most quickly and most certainly to a desired result.
John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum
A buffered environment is like a coddling parent, while a lean one not only lets you make mistakes, but arranges is so that you receive high fidelity feedback promptly.
It’s a cliche` that we learn by doing. Actually, we learn by testing our understanding. We learn by seeing if we’re right. A lean environment is conducive to this learning; a buffered one is not.
Rother’s genius is to take this wisdom and systematize it. In his books, he is drawing maps by which we can chart our own education. He says in a lecture (he has many available on youtube) that his primary interest is not in helping corporations, but in influencing primary education. You see these interests on his website .
He is doing both amazingly well. By drilling down into this subject, he has created material that anyone can use to change their life, because he takes the psychology of the scientific method and combines it with the psychology of habit-formation. His online training material and his books break down the concepts into practice routines we can use to develop the habits of scientific thinking.
In his book (quoted above) John Dewey presents the paradox: one needs a pattern to follow, some behavior to duplicate, so that they can walk out on their own and make their own discoveries. Pure inculcation won’t work, nor will random trial and error. Or at least, neither is efficient. Rother’s method is to train coaches, who can train ‘learners’ in the basic steps of the scientific method, and then let them (the learners) attempt to employ what they have learned.
This is all based on the Deming Cycle.
- You make a plan, which is a hypothesis about the way things are, the way things should be, what you should do to achieve this desired state, and a prediction about what will happen when you try.
- Then you run your experiment.
- Then you study the results.
- Then you reflect. You ask, what did those results tell me? Should I behave similarly in the future, or differently?
By training learners to perform what he calls Improvement Kata (a series of behaviors that promote scientific learning) Rother both teaches and doesn’t. He teaches the learner how to learn for themselves. That may sound like a cliche` too, but ask yourself, how many times have you seen it done successfully? It is painstaking to teach someone to learn for themselves, because you have to help them develop each behavior through diligent practice. You can’t just tell them how to do it. This is why Rother emphasizes the use of coaches and learners. He doesn’t claim that, by reading his books, you will be successful. He claims that, if you read his books, and engage in a coach/learner relationship in a supportive group, you might.
So, rather, he doesn’t teach how to learn. He teaches how to put yourself in a situation that will promote your drilling on the behaviors of learning. He provides not only the map, but also instructions on how use it, and instructions on how to draw your own map.
He teaches you to create your own kanban, and lower your own levels.
6‘Buffering is used in manufacturing to compensate for variations in the production process. Changes in supply and demand would be an example of these variations. Think of buffering as a means to ensure that production lines continue running smoothly despite unforeseen factors, such as machine breakdowns, coming into play.’
7 Toyota Kata, page viii
Why would you start a blog?
Is there a good time to start? There can’t be. There can’t be a good time to start thinking as hard as you can about something, and then showing what that looks like. It is always dangerous because you will be at least temporarily exiled from the people that you know. These familiars are strange now because their valence has changed. Now they have something that you want.
Before you only pointed at what they were likely to also see. You saw a sign, and so did they. Now you are signaling in strange ways. You can see it on their face. They don’t see it, and now there is doubt between you. And you’ve already tried your best. That was your output, and now you are waiting on them to look at you with recognition in their eyes.
So you should start now. Never put off alienation, because it will come eventually. We are estranged by almost everything because we do not consciously connect our unconscious mind with the unconscious world. We do not let that unconscious everything that is outside of us reconfigure our mind in its perfect image.
I say you and we to mean I, but don’t put it that way.
We mistake the consciousness for what is sacred and encompassing. If it exists at all, it is a spectator.
So I am writing to complete a circle. To watch myself write, to put back into the unconscious world what my unconscious mind observed, and to allow my unconscious mind to see what happens to the faces of a few readers when they unconsciously react. Gratefully, I can be conscious of some of this, superficially. And I can reflect on it.
I’m here to write about books mostly. Some of my favorite authors are
- Verlyn Klinkenborg
- Jordan Peterson
- Mike Rother
- Philip Roth
- Gregory Orr
- Cal Newport
- Anders Ericsson
- Wayne C. Booth
- Chip and Dan Heath
- David Allen
- Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
- David Shields
- Daniel Dennett
- Steven Pinker
- Philip Zimbardo
- Pëma Chödrön
- James Wood
- Anthony Gottlieb
- Alberto Manguel
- Karen Martin
- W Edwards Deming
- George Saunders
and I want to write about them so that I can better understand what they are saying.